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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FEDERAL IMMUNITY STATUTES AND
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT- FRESH BEGINNING OR
FALSE START?
Kastigarv. United States, 406 U.S. 444 (1972)
Petitioners were summoned before a United States grand jury. The Government, believing they might invoke the fifth amendment, obtained an
order compelling answers and granting immunity pursuant to the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970.' Petitioners appeared, but refused to answer,
whereupon the district court found them in contempt. Rejecting the petitioners' contention that the immunity grant was not broad enough to supplant the fifth amendment privilege, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.2 On certiorari 3 the Supreme Court affirmed and HELD,
immunity from use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom
is coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination and sufficient to
4
compel testimony over a claim of privilege.
The privilege against self-incrimination was established in Anglo-American law5 long before its incorporation into the United States Constitution. 6
Although courts have guarded the privilege zealously, there has never been
complete agreement on the ultimate interests it protects. 7 Some commentators have viewed it as a manifestation of the right to privacy, others as a
legalized form of civil disobedience. 8 Even among members of the Supreme
Court there has been contention that the privilege should shield witnesses
not only from threat of criminal prosecution but also from extra-judicial
effects of incriminating testimony.9 However, these interests must be counterbalanced by the paramount necessity for public disclosure of information relating to criminal activity.' 0 Consequently, the area of individual protection

1. 18 U.S.C. §6002 (1970).
2. Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971).
3. 402 U.S. 971 (1971).
4. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Powell, J., announced the opinion of the Court, in which
Burger, C.J., and Stewart, White, Blackmun, JJ., concurred. Douglas and Marshall, (JJ.,
dissented with opinions. Brennan and Rehnquist, JJ., took no part in the decision.
5. The privilege against self-incrimination developed from popular opposition to the
oath ex officio and its use to compel testimony in the Star Chamber. Both were abolished
in 1641. By the late 17th century the privilege had been established in the common law
courts. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2250, at 269-92 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
7. 8 J. WIGMORF, supra note 5, §2251, at 296.
8. Note, Witness Immunity Statutes: The Constitutional and Functional Sufficiency of
"Use Immunity," 51 BOSTON U.L. REv. 616, 618 (1971).
9. Compare Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 459-60 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
and Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 628 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting), with Ullman v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430 (1956) (majority opinion).
10. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §2192, at 70. Crimes such as bribery and conspiracy are likely to go unpunished unless one of the parties furnishes evidence against
the others. The likelihood of criminal prosecution, absent an immunity grant, obviously
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is narrow: the witness may claim the privilege for himself alone"i and only
2
when testimony will subject him to a possible criminal penalty.
Immunity statutes have been devised as a means of resolving the conflict
between the public's need to know and the individual's right to remain
silent.'s By withdrawing the witness' constitutionally guaranteed privilege
against self-incrimination and substituting protection commensurate therewith,'4 a balance is maintained between these competing interests. The first
federal immunity statute, 5 passed to aid congressional investigating committees, was broadly drawn and amenable to flagrant abuse by witnesses eager to
testify in order to gain immunity for undiscovered misdeeds. 8 Attempting to
rectify this situation, the succeeding statute only immunized witnesses from
actual use of compelled testimony but not from use of evidence indirectly
derived therefrom.'Y The immunity Act of 1868'8 embodied these provisions
and extended the use of witness immunity provisions to judicial proceedings.
The constitutionality of immunity legislation was first considered in
Counselman v. Hitchcock"s in 1892. A witness had been granted immunity
pursuant to the Act of 1868 but refused under court order to answer grand
jury questions and was sentenced for contempt. The Supreme Court approved the concept of the immunity device, but held that a statute must offer
protection coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege it purports to supplant.2 0 Since the Act of 1868 prohibited neither use of compelled testimony to
obtain new evidence nor introduction of evidence thus obtained in a subsequent prosecution, the Court held its protection was not sufficiently broad and

provides little incentive for a party to furnish such evidence.
11. E.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (corporate officer may not assert privilege
on behalf of corporation).
12. The testimony sought need not be sufficient to support a criminal conviction independently in order to invoke the privilege properly; it is sufficient if it supplies a connecting link in a chain of evidence that would lead to the witness' prosecution. E.g.,
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950). However, there must be a reasonable ground
as distinguished from a speculative possibility that the testimony will furnish such a link.
Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 865-66 (1917).
13. The immunity principle by which a witness is compelled to give testimony but
granted some degree of protection from its consequences was used as a means of eliciting
evidence in England as early as 1725 and made its appearance in American jurisprudence
in 1807. The first immunity statute, however, was not enacted until fifty years later. 8
J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §2281, at 492; Wendel, Compulsory Immunity Legislation and the
Fifth Amendment Privilege: New Developments and New Confusion, 10 ST. Louis L.J. 327,

30-33 (1966).
14. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 US. 547 (1892).
15. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155.
16. The impetus for reform was provided by two clerks of the Department of the
Interior, who embezzled $2 million and later obtained immunity from prosecution by
relating their exploit to a congressional committee. Wendel, supra note 13, at 334
17. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch, 11, 12 Stat. 333.
18. Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37.
19. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
20. Id. at 585.
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declared it unconstitutional.21 Furthermore, the Court stated in dictum that "a
statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against fu' 22
ture prosecution for the offense to which the question relates."
Reacting swiftly to the Counselman decision2 . Congress enacted a new
immunity statute 24 that afforded witnesses complete protection from criminal
proceedings growing out of any "transaction, matter, or thing" 25 that was
the subject of their testimony. The statute was sustained in Brown v. Walker 26
as meeting the requirement of coextensiveness, despite objections that it
offered no protection against state prosecution. Although the Supreme Court
noted that such protection was not constitutionally necessary, it construed
the statute to prohibit state prosecution of federal witnesses under an immunity grant. 27 This judicially sanctioned transactional immunity 8 became
29
the basis for subsequent federal immunity legislation.
After Brown a witness who testified under a federal immunity grant to
crimes committed in state A could not be prosecuted by state authorities.
However, the same witness testifying in state A under a state immunity grant
could be prosecuted for crimes committed under federal law3 0 or the laws
of state B. Although some authority existed to the contrary,3' federal precedent 32 supported this "two sovereignties" rule that required only the jurisdiction compelling the testimony to grant the witness immunity.

21. Id. at 586.
22. Id.
23. Dixon, The Fifth Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 Gao. WASH. L.
Rav. 447, 457-58 (1955).
24. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443.
25. Id.
26. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
27. Id. at 606-08. The power of Congress to prohibit subsequent state prosecutions
was upheld under the supremacy clause (U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, §2). The holding was
thoroughly reconsidered and reaffirmed in Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
Even lacking that construction the statute would have been sustained, since the Court
regarded state prosecution as an unsubstantial and remote possibility from which the
fifth amendment offered no protection. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608-09 (1896).
28. The concept embodied in the Act of 1893 and derived from the "absolute immunity"
dictum of Counselman is referred to as "transactional immunity." Under a grant of transactional immunity a witness is absolutely protected from future prosecution for criminal
acts revealed by his testimony. See Petition of Specter, 439 Pa. 404, 411-12, 268 A.2d 104, 109
(1970). In the present case the Court stated that transactional immunity is broader than
required by the fifth amendment. Consequently, it held that a witness may be compelled to
answer after being granted immunity from direct use of compelled testimony and evidence
directly or indirectly derived therefrom. Thus, under "use immunity" a witness may be
prosecuted for a crime revealed in compelled testimony, provided the prosecution is based
on independently obtained evidence. See text accompanying notes 55-61 infra.
29. See Wendel, supra note 13, at 348.
30. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1958). See Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372,
380 (1905).
31. United States v. Saline Bank, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100 (1828).
32. See, e.g., Murdock v. United States, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
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This situation of interjurisdictional immunity"3 was undesirable in the
eyes of state officials and witnesses, but posed no problem for federal officials
until the fifth amendment was made applicable to state proceedings in 1964.34
This necessitated precise definition of the effect of immunity granted by one
sovereign on the prosecutorial powers of another. Sweeping aside the two
sovereignties rule as outmoded and historically ill-founded, the Supreme
5
Court held in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor"
that a state witness could not be compelled to testify unless the testimony and
its fruits could not be used against him in a federal prosecution.3 6 Moreover,
to implement this decision the federal government was prohibited from
using compelled testimony or any evidence derived therefrom in prosecuting
a witness for a crime revealed under a state immunity grant.37 Consequently,
a witness under a grant of "use immunty"s could be prosecuted by a different jurisdiction for criminal acts revealed in his testimony only if an
independent, legitimate source exists for the evidence challenged as being
the fruit of compelled testimony. The Court observed, however, that this
placed the witness in substantially the same position as if, absent state immunity, he had properly invoked his fifth amendment privilege.39
The Court's decision in Murphy caused serious doubt as to the vitality of
transactional immunity,40 which had been the basis of federal immunity
statutes since 1893 and repeatedly upheld by the courts.4 1 Some commentators viewed the decision as settling only the interjurisdictional immunity
problem and leaving the transactional requirement unchanged where intra-

33. "Interjurisdictional immunity" as used herein describes the situation in which
a witness is granted immunity by state A, then state B wishes to prosecute him for matters
revealed in his testimony. "Intrajurisdictional immunity" describes the situation in which
state A grants immunity to a witness and later wishes to prosecute him for matters revealed
in his testimony. See Note, supra note 8, at 618.
34. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
35. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
36. Id. at 79.
37. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 79 (1964). It is unclear whether
this exclusionary rule was based on constitutional grounds or the Courts supervisory
powers. A footnote suggested exclusion of compelled testimony and tainted evidence was
constitutionally required. Id. at 79 n.18. The opinion of the Court in the instant case seems
to confirm this view. 406 U.S. at 457 n.43.
38. See note 28 supra.
89. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
40. E.g., Byers v. People, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1969),
vacated on other grounds, 402 U.S. 424 (1971). But see In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32, 85-37
(7th Cir. 1971), revd, 406 U.S. 952 (1972). In his concurring opinion in Murphy Justice
White specifically rejected transactional immunity as being broader than that required
by the fifth amendment. Id. at 102-03. One commentator noted, however, that the cases
cited to support this position are factually distinguishable. Wendel, supra note 13, at 372.
The Court in the instant case relied instead on Murphy to reach the same conclusion. 406
U.S. at 455-59.
41. In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32, 35-37 (7th Cir. 1971), revd, 406 U.S. 952 (1972).
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jurisdictional immunity 42 was concerned. 43 Others contended it meant transactional immunity was not constitutionally required in any circumstance,
since the Court made no reference to the "absolute immunity" dictum in its
citations of Counselman.44 Therefore, while the requirement that immunity
statutes provide protection co-extensive with the privilege against self-incrimination remained unchanged, 45 the quantum of protection required
was in doubt.
The Organized Crime Control Act of 197046 attempted to inject order
47
into the undisciplined proliferation of federal witness immunity statutes.
4
8
The drafters of the immunity provision, influenced by Murphy and later
cases, 49 wished not only to provide protection for the witness commensurate
with the fifth amendment privilege, but also to make the scope of the immunity as narrow as possible to avoid hampering state and federal law enforcement.50 The statute provided that "no testimony or other information
compelled . . . or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information ... [could] be used against [a witness] in any
criminal case." 51 Transactional immunity was abandoned altogether in favor
of use immunity. 52 Murphy already permitted the federal government to
prosecute a witness for acts revealed in testimony compelled by a state, as
long as no tainted evidence was used. The Act went further by allowing the
federal government to compel testimony and later prosecute the witness itself
for acts revealed thereby. Judicial reaction to the new statute was mixed.
The Ninth Circuit upheld it, following the reasoning of Murphy;53 the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits, however, found that the case did not narrow
Counselman's transactional standard for interjurisdictional immunity and
54
held the Act unconstitutional.

42.

See note 33 supra.

43. See Sobel, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination "Federalized," 31 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 1, 44-47 (1964).
44. Wendel, supra note 13, at 370.
45. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 54 (1964).
46. 18 U.S.C. §§6001-05 (1970).
47. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 replaced fifty-three existing immunity
statutes that had been passed in connection with various pieces of regulatory legislation.
See 2

NATIONAL COMMISSION

ON REFORM

OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,

WORKING PAPERS

1411,

app. A at 1444-45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS].
48. Id. at 1422-32; McClellan, The Organized Crime Control Act (S.30) or Its Critics:
Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NoTRE DAME LAW. 55, 82-86 (1970).
49. E.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); see WORKING PAPERS, supra note 46,
at 1427-28.
50. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 46, at 1412.
51. 18 U.S.C. §6002 (1970).
52. New Jersey had adopted a new immunity statute prior to enactment of the
Organized Crime Control Act, which was upheld in Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of
Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972), decided the same day as the instant case.
53.

Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971); Bacon v. United States, 446

F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1971); Charleston v. United States, 444 F.2d 504 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 916 (1971).
54. United States v. Cropper, 454 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 952 (1972);
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In the instant case the Supreme Court relied heavily on Murphy, although conceding that it dealt with a different aspect of the immunity
problem. 5 Since the scope of the fifth amendment privilege is identical in
all jurisdictions, the majority reasoned that if use immunity secures a state
witness' privilege against the federal government then use immunity must
be coextensive with the scope of the privilege.5 6In his dissent Justice Douglas
maintained Murphy should be distinguished, since the consideration for the
right of the several states to prosecute violations of their laws, which influenced the Court in Murphy, was absent in the instant case. 57
Although subsequent to Murphy5s the Court continued to cite the
Counselman dictum from which transactional immunity was derived, 9 the
Court specifically rejected it in the instant case.60 However, the majority concluded that its decision was consistent with the narrow ground on which
Counselman was decided, 61 since the statute under consideration protected
against indirect use of compelled testimony to adduce new evidence. The
prosecution was held to an affirmative burden "to prove that the evidence
it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of
the compelled testimony." 62 Justice Marshall, dissenting, objected that this
left the witness dependent on the good faith of the prosecutor who alone
possesses information relative to the question of taint. Moreover, good
faith is insufficient, since it would be virtually impossible for a prosecutor who relies on scores of investigative personnel to be certain that some
63
use of compelled testimony has not been made.
The instant case although predictable, 64 drastically reduces the amount of
protection enjoyed by a witness under a federal immunity grant. The Court's
failure to deal more specifically with the burden of establishing an independent basis for evidence introduced at a witness' subsequent trial means
standards will be developed only by future litigation. Furthermore, use immunity may be counterproductive of the goal it seeks to achieve. A witness
under subpoena faced with either a contempt sentence if he refuses to answer
or a possible prosecution if he does answer will have no reason to be more
than minimally cooperative. A witness who might otherwise remain unknown
will have little incentive to come forward voluntarily. As Justice Brennan

In re Korman, 449 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd 406 U.S. 952 (1972).

55. 406 US. at 457-58.
56. Id. at 458.

57. Id. at 464 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 28-29 n.36 (1948).

59. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
60. 406 U.S. at 454-55.
61.

See text accompanying note 21 supra.

62. 406 U.S. at 460.
63. Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. Note, supra note 8, at 648-49.
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